Many research ethics guidelines now oblige researchers to offer research participants the results of research in which they participated. This practice is intended to uphold respect for persons and ensure that participants are not treated as mere means to an end. Yet some scholars have begun to question a generalised duty to disclose research results, highlighting the potential harms arising from disclosure and questioning the ethical justification for a duty to disclose, especially with respect to individual results. In support of (...) this view, we argue that current rationales for a duty of disclosure do not form an adequate basis for an ethical imperative. We review policy guidance and scholarly commentary regarding the duty to communicate the results of biomedical, epidemiological and genetic research to research participants and show that there is wide variation in opinion regarding what should be disclosed and under what circumstance. Moreover, we argue that there is fundamental confusion about the notion of “research results,” specifically regarding three core concepts: the distinction between aggregate and individual results, amongst different types of research, and across different degrees of result veracity. Even where policy guidance and scholarly commentary have been most forceful in support of an ethical imperative to disclose research results, ambiguity regarding what is to be disclosed confounds ethical action. (shrink)

Background: Expanded newborn screening generates incidental results, notably carrier results. Yet newborn screening programmes typically restrict parental choice regarding receipt of this non-health serving genetic information. Healthcare providers play a key role in educating families or caring for screened infants and have strong beliefs about the management of incidental results. Methods: To inform policy on disclosure of infant sickle cell disorder (SCD) carrier results, a mixed-methods study of healthcare providers was conducted in Ontario, Canada, to understand attitudes regarding result management (...) using a cross-sectional survey (N = 1615) and semistructured interviews (N = 42). Results: Agreement to reasons favouring disclosure of SCD carrier results was high (65.1%–92.7%) and to reasons opposing disclosure was low (4.1%–18.1%). Genetics professionals expressed less support for arguments favouring disclosure (35.3%–78.8%), and more agreement with arguments opposing disclosure (15.7%–51.9%). A slim majority of genetics professionals (51.9%) agreed that a reason to avoid disclosure was the importance of allowing the child to decide to receive results. Qualitatively, there was a perceived “duty” to disclose, that if the clinician possessed the information, the clinician could not withhold it. Discussion: While a majority of respondents perceived a duty to disclose the incidental results of newborn screening, the policy implications of these attitudes are not obvious. In particular, policy must balance descriptive ethics (ie, what providers believe) and normative ethics (ie, what duty-based principles oblige), address dissenting opinion and consider the relevance of moral principles grounded in clinical obligations for public health initiatives. (shrink)

Debate continues to rage among philosophers of religion over Anthony Flew's famous little paper ‘Theology and Falsification’ and the responses it provoked, most notably R. M. Hare's response that religious claims are in no way like scientific hypotheses. For now, twenty years later, we still find many theists taking a similar tack to Hare's. A particularly interesting example is J. F. Miller in Religious Studies, 1969, who replies to Flew that propositions like ‘God loves mankind’ cannot be subject to falsifiability (...) conditions because they are used as claims expressing ‘religious first-order principles of the Judaeo-Christian Weltanschauung and as such are not amenable to falsification’ (p. 50). Miller seems to put his faith in some kind of great gulf fixed between what he would consider decently falsifiable scientific hypotheses and what he takes to be unfalsifiable first-order principles both of theology and of contemporary science. In what follows we will try to sketch a more rational strategy for modern believers of a liberal empiricist type, for those whose interest in appealing and deferring to experience includes but is not restricted to so-called ‘sense experience’. This will involve accepting analogies between theological statements and so-called hypotheses, insofar as the latter are propositions held and put forward in a somewhat tentative spirit with a view to explaining what we experience. (shrink)

The avowed simplicity of thomasius' practical philosophy conceals its real complexity. His treatment of reason and will, Moral and political obligation, And freedom and authority particularly bears this out. The impact of his political philosophy was to transmute the operative ethos of absolutism by demonstrating that while absolute power was possible, Absolute authority was an absurdity.

"Growth," a term borrowed from biology, is often used to describe change in human history. The use of such terms, however, tends to obscure the fundamental differences between historical and natural causality. Vico and Herder were among the first to make a radical distinction between our understanding of events in nature and of those in human affairs. They argued that man can make conscious decisions which make his actions different from events in the nonhuman world. Yet, they also believed that (...) human history has a purpose of its own, which man cannot alter. However, if human choice is to be truly free, then the outcome of human history cannot be entirely predetermined. Though Vico and Herder, like many other writers, attempted to merge these two notions, they failed to provide a satisfactory theory. (shrink)

Reason and Self-Enactment in History and Politics also offers a reappraisal of basic political principles and constructs. Barnard argues for bridging differences among a plurality of truths and forming practical judgments through cultivation of a sense of situational appropriateness.

The object of this paper is to show that, in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., two different and radically opposed systems of thought were elaborated within the Pythagorean school. They may be called respectively the mystical system and the scientific. All current accounts of Pythagoreanism known to me attempt to combine the traits of both systems in one composite picture, which naturally fails to hold together. The confusion goes back to Aristotle, who usually speaks indiscriminately of ‘the Pythagoreans,’ though (...) now and then the phrase ‘some Pythagoreans’ indicates that he was aware of different currents within the school. (shrink)

This article describes a practical example of the predicate grue, examining the economic relationship between the percentage rate of unemployment and the percentage change of money wage rates known as the simple Phillips curve which exhibited regular behaviour before 1969 and erratic behaviour thereafter. It is proposed that such practical examples of grue from the real world be redescribed as regulatic. i.e. regular before time t and erratic thereafter. In the instance of a scientific model or theory being falsified it (...) is proposed to describe the predicate as tralse, i.e true before time t and false thereafter. The example to be discussed is a stronger example since entities in the real world started to behave in an extremely unpredictable fashion. (shrink)

Anaxagoras’ theory of matter offers a problem which, in bald outline, may be stated as follows. The theory rests on two propositions which seem flatly to contradict one another. One is the principle of Homoeomereity: A natural substance such as a piece of gold, consists solely of parts which are like the whole and like one another—every one of them gold and nothing else. The other is: ‘There is a portion of everything in everything’, understood to mean that a piece (...) of gold , so far from containing nothing but gold, contains portions of every other substance in the world. Unless Anaxagoras was extremely muddleheaded, he cannot have propounded a theory which simply consists of this contradiction. One or the other proposition must be reinterpreted so as to bring them into harmony. Some critics attack one, some the other; some try to modify both. Mr. C. Bailey has recently published a fresh attempt to reconstruct the theory in a form consistent with itself. But the result, as he admits, is arbitrary and uneconomical. These defects, like all the contradictions and obscurities found in other accounts of the system, can be traced to the second proposition: ‘There is a portion of everything in everything’, or rather to the construction put upon it. The language is crude, vague, and ambiguous. What does ‘everything’ mean? Has the first ‘everything’ the same sense as the second ? If taken to mean that there is a portion of every material substance in every material substance, the proposition leads to a result for which ‘uneconomical’ is an indulgent epithet. (shrink)

The object of this paper is to determine the relations between the two parts of Parmenides' poem: the Way of Truth, which deduces the necessary properties of a One Being, and the False Way, which contains a cosmogony based on ‘what seems to mortals, in which there is no true belief.’.

Bioethical Prescriptions collects F.M. Kamm's articles on bioethics -- revised for publication in book form -- which have appeared over the last 25 years and which have made her among the most widely-respected philosophers working in this field.

The earlier part of this paper yielded the result that the assertion ‘A portion of everything in everything’ has no place or function in the explanation of any sort of apparent ‘becoming’ or change. This conclusion is important because, ever since Aristotle, it has been assumed that the assertion was made in order to explain away becoming and change. But if , according to the best evidence, becoming and such sorts of change as Anaxagoras considered can be explained away without (...) using the assertion at all, it follows that the motive for it must be sought, not in the processes of apparent becoming and change, but in the permanent constitution of the ungenerated and unchanging things which figure as elements in the system. A visible mass of gold or of flesh is formed by the aggregation of smaller particles of gold or of flesh, and it is infinitely divisible into parts, every one of which is gold or flesh. But what is the constitution of a piece of gold of whatever size, and how does it differ from the constitution of a piece of flesh? The proposition we have so far successfully excluded comes in here as part of the answer to this question. (shrink)

The object of this paper is to determine the relations between the two parts of Parmenides' poem: the Way of Truth, which deduces the necessary properties of a One Being, and the False Way, which contains a cosmogony based on ‘what seems to mortals, in which there is no true belief.’.

I begin by reconsidering the arguments of John Taurek and Elizabeth Anscombe on whether the number of people we can help counts morally. I then consider arguments that numbers should count given by F. M. Kamm and Thomas Scanlon, and criticism of them by Michael Otsuka. I examine how different conceptions of the moral method known as pairwise comparison are at work in these different arguments and what the ideas of balancing and tie-breaking signify for decision-making in various types of (...) cases. I conclude by considering how another moral method that I call virtual divisibility functions and what it helps reveal about an argument by Otsuka against those who do not think numbers count. (shrink)

Collingwood's faith in the historian's intuitive capacity for discerning the meaning of past actions by re-enactment" is too unqualified. However, his thesis that through actions alone can reasons and inner meanings be discovered is true. This assumes that actions can be traced to recognizable agents and that these agents are able to acknowledge their reasons. The relation between knowing and doing and between knowing and understanding is a form of causality not inconsistent with teleological reasoning. Characteristic of human action are (...) the constitutive nature of causality, the delimiting effect of rationality on human autonomy, and the role of purpose as a mediating link between intention and outcome. Despite the fact that emphasis on impersonal actions and interactions seriously calls into question Collingwood's theory of understanding, any radical revision of this theory proves no less problematical. (shrink)